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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Daniel Abram Taylor appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict 
finding him guilty of lewd and lascivious conduct.  Taylor contends the district court 
committed evidentiary error and abused its sentencing discretion.   
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
 Taylor’s conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct is based on the following 
testimony presented at trial. 
Taylor married Ashley Felder in 2006, and their daughter, A.B.T., was born later 
that year.  (Tr., p.149, Ls.2-8; p.150, Ls.10-17.)  At the time of the marriage Ashley was 
already raising her own two-year-old son from another relationship, and several years 
after A.B.T. was born, Ashley gave birth to a second son, fathered by another man 
during a time of separation from Taylor.  (Tr., p.149, Ls.2-6; p.150, L.18 – p.151, L.4; 
p.173, L.16 – p.174, L.5.)  From June 2012 until October 2012, Taylor, Ashley and the 
three children lived in a house on North Second Street in Coeur d’Alene.  (Tr., p.159, 
L.24 – p.160, L.7.)   
Taylor and Ashley divorced in 2013.  (Tr., p.150, Ls.14-17.)  Later that year, 
Ashley took A.B.T. to Dr. Sara Morrow, a licensed psychologist, because A.B.T. had 
been displaying “over sexualized behavior at school,” “emotional variance issues,” and 
enuresis and encopresis (leading to toileting accidents), which began to appear when 
she was three or four years old.  (Tr., p.168, L.17 – p.170, L.14; p.361, L.25 – p.362, 
L.4.)   
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On December 1, 2013, Ashley had a conversation with A.B.T., and after 
speaking to Dr. Morrow about that conversation, Ashley was contacted by Detective 
Crystal Shaw of the Coeur d’Alene Police Department.  (Tr., p.170, L.15 – p.171, L.11.)  
At Detective Shaw’s request, Ashley took A.B.T. to the Child Advocacy Center to be 
interviewed.  (Tr., p.171, Ls.12-16.)  On December 9, 2013, while Detective Shaw 
interviewed A.B.T. at that facility, Ashley waited in the lobby.  (Tr., p.171, Ls.17-19; 
p.250, Ls.11-15.)  Over defense counsel’s objection at trial, a still image from the video-
audio recording of that interview – showing A.B.T. and Detective Shaw sitting at a small 
table in an interview room – was admitted into evidence.  (Tr., p.251, L.7 – p.254, L.2: 
St. Ex. 9.)  
On December 12, 2013, Detective Shaw conducted a videotaped interview of 
Taylor at the police department.  (Tr., p.255, L.13 – p.257, L.17.)  A redacted version of 
that video recording was admitted into evidence at trial and played for the jury.  (Tr., 
p.257, L.12 - p.261, L.1; St. Ex. 1-A.)  Based on her review of that interview, Detective 
Shaw’s police report, as set forth in the Presentence Report (“PSI”), summarized the 
interview as follows (with citations to the times indicated on the videotape):  
“I asked Daniel about these allegations.  Daniel adamantly denied ever 
taking a shower with [A.B.T.].  [St. Ex. 1-A, 11:47-14:45.]  Daniel said his 
hand has been on [A.B.T.’s] vaginal area as he wiped her or had to put 
medicine there.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 18:10-18:25.]  The last time she needed 
medicine on her vaginal area was when she was 5 years old.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 
18:26-18:50.]  Daniel used a prescribed cream and used his hands to put 
it on her vaginal area.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 18:50-19:38.]  Daniel said [A.B.T.] has 
been sexually over active [sic].  [A.B.T.] has tried to see his penis while he 
changed at the Kroc Center and when this happened, Daniel turned away 
from her.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 20:30-22:15.]  Daniel said another time while at the 
Kroc Center in the hot tub, he was floating on his back and [A.B.T.] tried to 
touch his penis.  I asked how he knew this.  He stated, “It seemed very 
obvious.”  He said his swimsuit was compressed and you could see the 
outline of his penis and that is why he thought she tried to touch him.  [St. 
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Ex. 1-A, 22:15-23:25.]  Another incident occurred when Daniel was 
sleeping and he woke up “hard”.  [A.B.T.] came into the room to “cuddle” 
with him and she “rubbed up against it”.  He and Ashley were still married 
and were in the same bed when this happened.  Daniel said he just rolled 
over.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 24:40-25:20.]  Daniel identified [A.B.T.’s] word for penis 
as a “winky”.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 32:15-32:28.]   
 
“I told Daniel some of the specifics that [A.B.T.] told me about how he 
touched her vaginal area.  Daniel stated, “I know that this happened.  No, 
I, I, I’m not denying that at all.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 32:30-32:54.]  I literally can’t 
image [sic] myself doing that.  l can’t image [sic] that would take place.”  
[St. Ex. 1-A, 32:55-33:00.]  Daniel also told me, “From my, from my view 
point if I did this and if this is, this is something that I did um, either I’ve 
completely blocked it out”.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 35:44-35:52.]  I told Daniel he 
knew what l was going to talk to him about today and he still came in.  I 
told him it was because I believe he wants to be honest about what 
happened.  Daniel said he has been thinking about this all week.  [St. Ex. 
1-A, 35:55-37:03.]  Daniel told me, “I remember a time that l did pull her 
lips apart and put um, uh cream on her, uh vagina.”  Daniel said it was 
approximately two years ago in CDA, ID.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 43:20-43:40.]  He 
said [A.B.T.’s] vagina was infected.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 43:41-43:43.]  I asked 
Daniel why this memory was bothering him.  I asked what part of that 
incident doesn’t feel right with him.  He said he just remembered that 
incident.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 44:10- 44:32.] 
 
“Daniel said he was trying to “visualize” the events that [A.B.T.] described.  
Daniel said “maybe I start getting hard”.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 45:39-45:55.]  He 
said what he is thinking “sickens” him and he can’t image [sic] doing this to 
her and it doesn’t make sense that he would do this.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 47:21-
49:02.]  Daniel agreed it was hard to remember this incident because it 
was an inappropriate situation with him and [A.B.T.].  [St. Ex. 1-A, 45:55-
53:05.]  During the two hours l spoke with Daniel, he told me of an incident 
that occurred with [A.B.T.] in the shower. 
 
“Daniel said he was showering, probably without soap because he rarely 
uses soap.  [A.B.T.] touched his penis.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 55:12-56:23.]  Daniel 
said he became aroused and his penis became “slightly engorged”.  [St. 
Ex. 1-A, 56:23-56:37.]  Daniel turned around and switched places with 
[A.B.T.].  [St. Ex. 1-A, 56:38-57:00.]  Daniel washed [A.B.T.’s] hair and 
then put his hand on her vagina.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 1:30:50-1:32:04; 1:33:43-
1:34:15.]  He stated, “I rubbed up against it, like rubbed back and forth.”  
This occurred on the outside of [A.B.T.’s] vagina.  [Id.]  He shut off the 
shower and picked [A.B.T.] up.  [Id.]  This is when his penis rubbed 
against [A.B.T.’s] vagina.  I asked if this is when his penis went inside.  He 
stated, “Brushed up the inside against the inside, yeah.”  Daniel was 
 4 
 
sexually aroused.  He said this “shocked” him.  [St. Ex. 1-A,1:32:06-
1:32:41.] 
 
“I told Daniel that the shock came after he did this and he could have 
picked [A.B.T.] up in a way that didn’t cause his penis to go inside of her 
vagina but he did this so his penis could touch her vaginal area.  He 
stated, “Right.”  [St. Ex. 1-A, 1:34:12-1:34:18.]  I confirmed he did this 
because he was turned on.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 1:33:05-1:33:22.]  Daniel said his 
penis touched [A.B.T.’s] vagina for approximately 5 seconds and went 
inside less than a second.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 1:33:22-1:33:42.]  I asked Daniel if 
rubbing [A.B.T.’s] vaginal area was for a sexual purpose and he stated, 
“Right.”  [St. Ex. 1-A, 1:34:12-1:34:18.]  I asked if he was getting more 
turned on when he was touching [A.B.T.] and he said yes.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 
1:34:20-1:34:24.]  He also advised his penis was becoming more erect.  
[St. Ex. 1-A, 1:34:25-1:34:34.]  Daniel said his hand was on his penis once 
or twice during this incident but he said he wasn’t “stroking” his penis.  [St. 
Ex. 1-A, 59:15-59:20.]  Daniel said he felt ashamed and scared.  [St. Ex. 
1-A, 1:34:26-1:34:34.]  I asked if he was scared because he was turned on 
and was aroused and he said yes.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 59:33-59:49.]  He said the 
tip of his penis might have gone past the folds of her vagina while they 
were inside the shower. [St. Ex. 1-A, 59:55-1:00:22; 1:32:05-1:32:12.]  
Daniel then said it might have occurred when they were out of the shower 
and the towel was around them.  When he picked [A.B.T.] up his penis 
went past the folds of her vagina and “just the tip” of his penis went 
“inside”.  I asked how far and Daniel pointed to just below the top of his 
pinky.  [St. Ex. 1-A,1:17:00-1:18:50.] 
 
“I asked if he and [A.B.T.] talked about keeping what: [sic] happened a 
secret.  Daniel stated, “I probably said that, yeah.”  I asked Daniel why he 
would tell [A.B.T.] this.  He said it was because he felt like he was 
probably going to get into trouble[.]  He said he probably told [A.B.T.], 
“Don’t say anything so I don’t get into trouble”.  He agreed he didn’t want 
anyone else to find out about what happened with [A.B.T.].  [St. Ex. 1-A, 
1:01:05-1:01:10; 1:39:25-1:40:00.]  When I reference what [A.B.T.] has 
already told me Daniel stated, “Everything that [A.B.T.] has said is true.”  
[St. Ex. 1-A, 1:15:18-1:15:23.] 
 
“I asked what else has happened with [A.B.T.].  [St. Ex. 1-A, 1:02:20-
1:02:22.]  He said there was a time when he was putting cream on her that 
he went “too far”.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 1:02:23-1:02:42.]  He said while [sic] he 
pulled her “lips” in and was close to the edge.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 1:03:00-
1:03:10.]  He said it’s possible the tip of his finger went inside of [A.B.T.].  
[St. Ex. 1-A, 1:03:11-1:03:18.] I asked Daniel to place his hand on a sheet 
of paper.  l traced his hand.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 1:22:08-1:22:14.]  On the paper, 
Daniel identified that he used his index and middle finger to put cream on 
her vaginal area.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 1:22:45-1:22:50.]  I asked Daniel which 
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finger he used when his finger went inside.  He held up his hand and 
looked at it for a few seconds and then identified it was his middle finger.  
[St. Ex. 1-A, 1:22:51-1:23:00.]  l asked him to draw a line indicating how 
far his finger went inside [A.B.T.]. Daniel drew a couple of lines at the top 
part of his middle finger and colored it in.[1] [St. Ex. 1-A, 1:23:01-1:23:16.]  
This occurred when [A.B.T.] was five year[s] old.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 1:23:17-
1:23:23.]  Daniel had told me earlier that they were living in CDA and they 
lived at Ashley’s current residence on 2nd Street for 1-2 years, [A.B.T.] 
would have been 5 years old during this time.  [St. Ex. 1-A, 1:01:05-
1:01:15; 1:23:20-1:23:25.] 
 
(PSI, pp.5-7.) 
After December 2013, Ashley took A.B.T. to High Roads Human Services for 
therapy, and during the summer of 2014, Ashley took her to the Kootenai Medical 
Center (KMC) for inpatient mental health treatment because she “was being impulsive 
and was making unsafe choices of herself and other people.”  (Tr., p.171, L.20 – p.172, 
L.23; p.393, Ls.11-17; p.397, L.20 – p.398, L.17.)  A.B.T. remained at KMC for “a week 
or so,” and after her stay, she resumed treatment through High Roads Human Services.  
(Tr., p.172, L.24 – p.173, L.9.) 
Dr. Morrow testified that she works with children as young as three or four, and 
treats children with “significant emotional behavioral disorders,” including “anxiety 
disorders, behavioral problems, anger, aggression, trauma” and “usually some of the 
hardest child cases in this area.”  (Tr., p.359, L.21 – p.360, L.3.)  Dr. Morrow testified 
that A.B.T. exhibited a variety of symptoms that are consistent with having been 
sexually abused:  (1) she sometimes “shut down,” had low energy, and was totally 
disconnected, (2) at other times, she was very animated, hyper, defiant, and irritable, (3) 
she was hypersexual in her interactions with her younger brother to the extent that she 
                                                          
1  The drawing Detective Shaw made of Taylor’s hand during the interview was admitted 
into evidence as State’s Exhibit 2, and is attached as Appendix B.   (Tr., p.261, Ls.2-22.) 
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could not be left alone with him, and was sexual on the stage at school, (4) she 
“continually violated space boundaries in multiple interpersonal interactions,” (5) she 
had “toileting problems,” including “retaining her bowels so severely . . . that she had to 
be taken to the emergency room to have her colon cleared because she was so 
constipated she was vomiting bile,” (6) she had poor regulation of her emotions, where 
“very minor stressors” resulted in “level 10 emotional meltdowns,” and (7) she had sleep 
disturbance.  (Tr., p.361, L.1 – p.366, L.25.)    
The state also presented testimony by Dr. Mary Dietzen, a psychologist who 
specializes “in child abuse including child sexual abuse, physical abuse, and neglect.”  
(Tr., p.391, L.12 – p.392, L.19.)  Dr. Dietzen reviewed “[t]he medical records, court 
documents, counseling records, the Kootenai County Medical Center records,” the 
police department records, and the Child Advocacy Center records in regard to A.B.T.’s 
case.  (Tr., p.393, Ls. 11-19.)  Dr. Dietzen summarized the behaviors by A.B.T. that are 
“consistent with children who have been sexually abused” (Tr., p.393, Ls.23-25) as 
follows: 
 The sexual acting-out behaviors, the sexual aggressive behaviors, 
the acting out at school with other kids, lifting up her dress, showing – 
spreading her legs at the Kootenai County place where she – little kids 
don’t – they don’t know that.  That was big.  The other acting-out 
behaviors that were red flags to me as some concerns that something was 
going on with this child – setting a blanket on fire, setting – putting her 
brother in the heat vent. 
 
 As I said, sexually acting out at home, school, with peers, and at 
the Kootenai Medical Center.  Those were some of the biggest ones.  And 
then also the medical issues, the bladder infections. 
 
(Tr., p.395, Ls.12-24).   
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 In regard to A.B.T.’s psychiatric hospitalization, Dr. Dietzen explained, “[t]here 
has to be those specific behaviors, acting out and other types of issues that are 
happening with this  because they don’t like to keep kids in the hospital for a long 
time.”  (Tr., p.398, Ls.13-17.)  When asked about A.B.T.’s habit of spreading her legs, 
Dr. Dietzen explained, “[t]hat’s so out of line for a  to be spreading her legs like that 
and knowing how to – to touch herself in such a way that she’s exposing herself in a 
very sexual, provocative way.”  (Tr., p.399, Ls.13-16.)  
 On January 24, 2014, the state charged Taylor with one count of lewd conduct 
with a  under 16, alleging that on or between 2011 and 2012, when A.B.T. was 
five years old, he touched her “genital area with his fingers and/or penis with the intent 
to gratify the sexual desire of [Taylor].”  (R., pp.45-46.)  The state later filed an 
Amended Information which alleged that the offense occurred when A.B.T. was five or 
six years old.  (R., pp.110-111.)  After a trial, the jury was deadlocked and the district 
court declared a mistrial.  (R., p.222.) 
 Upon re-trial, the jury convicted Taylor of the charge of lewd conduct with a  
under 16.  (R., pp.398, 423.)  Taylor filed a motion for a new trial, arguing, inter alia, that 
the district court erred by admitting the photo of A.B.T. (St. Ex. 9, attached as Appendix 
A) into evidence (R., pp.426-427), which was denied after a hearing (R., pp.433-436).  
The court imposed a unified 15-year sentence with five years fixed.  (R., pp.444-449.)  
Taylor filed a Rule 35 motion (R. p.468), which the district court partially granted by 
reducing the fixed term of his unified 15-year sentence to four years (R., pp.474-475).  
Taylor filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment and sentence.  (R., pp.454-455, 
462-466.)       
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ISSUES 
 
 Taylor states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it admitted into evidence a photograph of 
the alleged victim? 
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to place 
Mr. Taylor on probation? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.9.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Taylor failed to show prejudicial error in the district court’s admission of a 
photo of the victim?   
 
2. Has Taylor failed to show the district court abused its sentencing discretion in 
imposing and executing a unified 15-year sentence with four years fixed upon the jury 
verdict finding Taylor guilty of lewd and lascivious conduct? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
Taylor Has Failed To Show Prejudicial Error In The District Court’s Admission Of A 
Photo Of The Victim 
 
A. Introduction 
 Taylor asserts that the district court erred by admitting into evidence a still video-
photo of the victim, A.B.T., taken from the videotaped recording of her interview with 
Detective Shaw at the Childrens’ Advocacy Center.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.10-16; see St. 
Ex. 9, Appendix A.)  Taylor argues that, contrary to the prosecutor’s contention and the 
district court’s apparent ruling, the photo of A.B.T. was not relevant to show the 
detective ‘“followed the correct procedures when she gave the interview.’”  (Appellant’s 
Brief, p.12 (quoting Tr., p.252, L.23 – p.253, L.2).)  Alternatively, he argues that any 
probative value of the photo was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.12-14.)  Taylor’s arguments fail. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“The question of whether evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo, while the 
decision to admit relevant evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”  State v. 
Shutz, 143 Idaho 200, 202, 141 P.3d 1069, 1071 (2006) (citing State v. Lamphere, 130 
Idaho 630, 632, 945 P.2d 1, 3 (1997)).  When the appellate court reviews an evidentiary 
ruling for abuse of discretion, it conducts “a multi-tiered inquiry, examining 1) whether 
the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion, 2) whether the court 
acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal 
standards applicable to specific choices, and 3) whether the court reached its decision 
by an exercise of reason.”  State v. Hoak, 147 Idaho 919, 921, 216 P.3d 1291, 1293 (Ct. 
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App. 2009) (citation omitted).  “[W]hen reviewing the determination that the probative 
value of the evidence is not outweighed by unfair prejudice,” the Court “use[s] an abuse 
of discretion standard.”  State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 393, 924 P.2d 1230, 1237 (Ct. 
App. 1996) (citations omitted). 
 
C. Taylor Has Failed To Show Error In The Admission Of A Photo Of The Victim 
 
To be admissible, evidence must be relevant.  I.R.E. 401, 402.  Evidence that 
tends to prove the existence of a fact of consequence in the case, and has any 
tendency to make the existence of that fact more probable than it would be without the 
evidence is relevant.  State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 544, 547, 768 P.2d 807, 810 (Ct. App. 
1989).  The district court correctly determined that the photo of A.B.T. was relevant.   
Before moving to admit the photo of A.B.T. into evidence (St. Ex. 9, Appendix A), 
the prosecutor asked Detective Shaw if the photo is “an accurate photograph of where 
you were positioned, where [A.B.T.] was positioned, inside that room on December 9, 
2013?”, and Detective Shaw said, “[i]t does.”  (Tr., p.251, Ls.18-22.)  When the 
prosecutor moved to admit the photo into evidence, Taylor’s trial counsel objected, 
stating: 
 Your Honor, I object on relevance.  That photograph has absolutely 
no relevance whatsoever.  Counsel is trying to offer it because there’s a 
cute little girl sitting in there.  He’s trying to do nothing but draw sympathy 
from the jury.  And there is an extreme danger that that’s exactly the only 
thing that the jury would use that photograph for.  There’s no attack on this 
witness.  There’s no need to try to bolster, which is what this would also 
be, improper bolstering of testimony, if what he’s trying to do, as he 
indicated, is just to show where they’re seated.  There’s no probative 
value, and the danger of unfair prejudice is high.  So I object. 
 
(Tr., p.252, Ls.9-21.)   
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 The prosecutor explained that he anticipated the defense to present a witness 
who would challenge whether the correct procedures were used during the interview.  
(Tr., p.252, L.23 – p. 253, L.2.)  The prosecutor further asserted that the photo would 
not “draw pity from the jury,” that A.B.T. was not crying in the photo, and that she is 
“simply seated in the same position she was when she was being questioned by the 
detective in the very same room where this happened.”  (Tr., p.253, Ls.2-10.)  The 
district court ruled the photo admissible, explaining that the “method of conducting the 
interview, as I recall it,[2] becomes an issue,” and that “it does have some probative 
effect on the issues regarding the interview” and “[i]t’s certainly not overly prejudicial.”  
(Tr., p.253, L.21 – p.254, L.2.) 
 On appeal, Taylor claims the district court erred when it found the photo of A.B.T. 
was relevant to whether or not correct procedures were followed during Detective 
Shaw’s interview with A.B.T.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-12.)  Taylor argues that the photo 
“did not have any tendency to make the existence of any fact that was of consequence 
to the determination of the action . . . more probable or less probable.”3  (Appellant’s 
Brief, p.12.)  Taylor’s argument fails on several counts.   
 Regardless of whether Taylor challenged the procedures and/or setting 
employed by Detective Shaw in interviewing A.B.T. at the Childrens’ Advocacy Center, 
the state had the right to show the jury that proper procedures and an untainted/non-
suggestive setting were used during the interview.  Although Taylor does not dispute 
                                                          
2  It appears the district court was referring to the first trial, which resulted in a mistrial 
because the jury was deadlocked.  The record does not reflect any defense witnesses 
who actually challenged the procedures used by Detective Shaw to interview A.B.T. 
 
3  Taylor argued below that the only purpose for introducing A.B.T.’s photo was to 
create sympathy because she was a “cute little girl.”  (Tr., p.252, Ls.11-15.)   
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that the alleged victim of his lewd conduct was A.B.T., the fact that A.B.T. was a young 
 who went through the process of going to the Childrens’ Advocacy Center to be 
interviewed by Detective Shaw in an unadorned (i.e., no toys, dolls, etc.) setting was 
relevant to the determination of this case, whether challenged or not.  A defendant 
cannot prevent the state from proving its case by evidence, even with a stipulation.  
State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 86-87, 253 P.3d 754, 760-761 (Ct. App. 2011); see People 
v. Scheid, 939 P.2d 748, 757 (Cal. 1997) (“The general rule is that the prosecution in a 
criminal case cannot be compelled to accept a stipulation if the effect would be to 
deprive the state’s case of its persuasiveness and forcefulness.”) (internal quotation 
omitted).  Therefore, a photo showing A.B.T. in that bare setting as she was questioned 
by a detective about an embarrassing subject was relevant information for the jury to 
consider. 
 Next, the fact that A.B.T. did not testify at trial made it important for the state to 
be able to show the jury in some other way that A.B.T. was more than a faceless, non-
descript   Similar to homicide cases in which the state is often permitted to 
introduce an “in-life” photo of the victim to prove the victim’s identity or show the victim 
as a living human being, the jury was entitled to see a photo of A.B.T. to be able to view 
her as more than just a name bandied about in court.  See Williams v. State, 609 S.E.2d 
122, 125 (Ga. App. 2004) (“Generally, photographs of a victim in life are admissible.”); 
Eldred v. Commonwealth, Ky., 906 S.W.2d 694, 704-705 (Ky. 1994) (“There is no error 
in presenting evidence of a victim as a living person, as opposed to a mere statistic, 
provided the evidence is not shocking, sensational, likely to provoke anger, or likely to 
induce undue sympathy or hostility.”); McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 669 S.W.2d 
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519, 523 (Ky. 1984) (“It would, of course, behoove the appellant to be tried for the 
murder of a statistic, but we find no error in bringing to the attention of the jury that the 
victim was a living person ....”).  
 Lastly, the photo of A.B.T., taken shortly before her seventh birthday, gave the 
jury an opportunity to see her physical size when she was near the age when the 
offense took place.  A.B.T.’s size was a relevant factor for the jury to consider in light of 
Taylor’s interview explanation about how he lifted her into the shower and maneuvered 
her body into a position that allowed him to slightly penetrate her genital area with his 
penis.      
 For the above-stated reasons, this Court should conclude, under de novo review, 
that the photo of A.B.T. (St. Ex. 9) was relevant.   
 Taylor argues that, “[e]ven if the photograph were relevant, it should have been 
excluded under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 because its minimal probative value was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Mr. Taylor.”  (Appellant’s 
Brief, p.12.)  Evidence may be excluded if its potential for “unfair prejudice” substantially 
outweighs its probative value.  I.R.E. 403.  “Unfair prejudice” is the tendency to suggest 
a decision on an improper basis.  State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720, 722 
(2010).  
 Taylor argued at trial, as he does on appeal, that the prosecutor wanted to admit 
the photograph of A.B.T. into evidence “because there’s a cute little girl sitting there[,]” 
and he was “trying to do nothing but draw sympathy from the jury.”  (Appellant’s Brief, 
p.14; Tr., p.253, Ls.11-13.)  The prosecutor responded that the photograph of A.B.T. 
was not one that would “draw pity from the jury[,]” that she was not shown crying or 
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“playing emotions,” and that she was “simply seated in the same position she was when 
she was being questioned by the detective in the very same room where [the interview] 
happened.”  (Tr., p.253, Ls.2-8.)   
 The district court plainly accepted the prosecutor’s view that the photo of A.B.T. 
would not create undue jury sympathy, ruling “[i]t’s certainly not overly prejudicial” and 
“it does have some probative effect on the issues regarding the interview.”  (Tr., p.253, 
L.24 – p.254, L.2.)  Indeed, there is nothing about the unadorned photo of A.B.T. that 
would draw undue sympathy from the jury – an unrehearsed still screen shot from the 
videotaped interview as she sat at a small table across from Detective Shaw.  (See 
Appendix A.)  That A.B.T. is a “cute little girl” does not mean the jury was blinded by 
sympathy in rendering a verdict.  By that reasoning, every “cute little girl” sexual abuse 
victim testifying at trial would have to be screened off from the jury to prevent the jury 
from being unfairly swayed by sympathy.  After weighing the negligible prejudice of 
A.B.T.’s photo against its relevance to show that proper procedures were followed in 
Detective Shaw’s interview of A.B.T., and for the additional “relevance” considerations 
noted above, the court reasonably exercised its discretion in admitting the photo of 
A.B.T. into evidence.    
 Finally, even if the district court erred by admitting the photo of A.B.T. into 
evidence, this Court should find that, based on the evidence presented at trial as set 
forth in the Statement of Facts, supra, and relied upon for the state’s argument here, 
such error is harmless.  As the Idaho Supreme Court recently explained in State v. 
Razo-Chavez, 159 Idaho 590, 592-593, 364 P.3d 291, 293-294 (2016):  
 Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity 
or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”  
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I.C.R. 52.  “The determination of whether a substantial right has been 
affected hinges on whether it appears from the record that the error 
contributed to the verdict.”  State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 636, 977 
P.2d 890, 898 (1999); State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 140, 334 P.3d 806, 
814 (2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “An error is 
harmless if, and only if, the appellate court is able to say, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the same result 
absent the error.” Id; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 
824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710–11 (1967); State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 
664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010). 
 A summary of the evidence presented at trial shows that the proof of Taylor’s 
guilt was overwhelming:  (1) Taylor gave an extremely detailed confession during his 
interview with Detective Shaw, admitting he was sexually aroused when he penetrated 
A.B.T.’s genital area (between her “lips”) with the tip of his middle finger (see St. Ex. 2) 
and the tip of his penis, (2) Taylor has two masters degrees and was a high school 
teacher at the time of the offense, which shows he was not overmatched or intimidated 
by Detective Shaw into giving a false confession, (3) Detective Shaw’s videotaped 
interview with Taylor (see St. Ex. 1-A) reveals that, while persistent, the detective was 
courteous and professional throughout, and (4) according to two expert  
psychologists, Dr. Morrow and Dr. Dietzen, the extreme emotional and behavioral 
symptoms displayed by A.B.T. were consistent with those commonly exhibited by  
sexual abuse victims.  Based on the above-described factors, this Court should 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that, even if the photo of A.B.T. had not been 
admitted into evidence at trial, the result would have been the same.  See  Razo-
Chavez, 159 Idaho at 592-593, 364 P.3d at 293-294. 
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II. 
Taylor Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion In 
Imposing A Unified Sentence Of Fifteen Years With Four Years Fixed Upon The Jury 
Verdict Finding Taylor Guilty Of Lewd Conduct 
 
 
A. Introduction 
  Taylor contends that the district court abused its discretion by failing to place him 
on probation and, instead, executing a unified sentence of 15 years with four years 
fixed.4  (Appellant’s brief, pp.39-41.)  Taylor’s arguments do not establish an abuse of 
discretion.   
 
B. Standard Of Review  
 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review only for 
an abuse of discretion.  State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).  
 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of sentencing discretion, the 
appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence is 
excessive.  State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).  To 
establish that the sentence is excessive, Taylor must demonstrate that reasonable 
minds could not conclude the sentence is appropriate to accomplish the sentencing 
goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.  Id.  Idaho 
appellate courts presume that the fixed portion of a sentence will be the defendant’s 
probable term of confinement.  State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999). 
                                                          
4  The district court partially granted Taylor’s Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence 
by reducing the fixed portion of his sentence from five years to four years, but retaining 
the 15-year unified sentence. (R., pp.468, 474-475.)  
 17 
 
Based on the nature of the crime (see Statement of Facts, supra), the impact on 
the victim – his then five-year-old  Taylor’s criminal history,5 and his refusal to 
accept responsibility for his conduct, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
imposing a unified 15-year sentence with four years fixed.  Indeed, the Presentence 
Report recommended Taylor be sentenced to prison, stating: 
The Defendant presently denies his offense and therefore expressed no 
remorse.  Though he has some protective factors in his life – higher 
education, stable housing, and family support; [sic] there are also several 
areas of significant concern, including his history of domestic violence 
(involving a woman and a  menacing/harassment, and violation of a 
protection order.  He also appears to have a history of alcohol and 
marijuana abuse.  Though this is the Defendant’s first felony offense, the 
incestuous nature of the crime, the vulnerability of the victim, and the lack 
of remorse on the Defendant’s part – are all compelling reasons for the 
imposition of a term sentence.  Therefore, based on his level of assessed 
risk/need and with consideration for the protective and/or other factors 
discussed above, it is respectfully recommended that Daniel Abram Taylor 
be sentenced to the physical custody of the Idaho Department of 
Correction. 
 
(PSI, p.27.)   
 At the sentence hearing, the district court acknowledged a statement by A.B.T. 
that was read into evidence at the sentencing hearing, and concluded: 
And it’s apparent to me that the victim has suffered emotionally and will 
continue to do so.  Whether all of that is the product of the actions of 
                                                          
5  According to the Presentence Report: 
 
The Defendant’s criminal history reveals he has 18 primary charges and 
no probation violation charges on his records.  Records reveal the instant 
offense is his first adult felony conviction . . . .  The Defendant also has 
two misdemeanor convictions in Colorado, which stem from a [sic] two 
separate (but related) cases on 08/21/2010 and 08/23/2010. Records 
indicate he has one withheld judgment (deferred and dismissed) for a 
charge of  abuse in that same above-referenced case. 
 
(PSI, p.12.) 
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Mr. Taylor is not entirely clear but certainly those – these actions have 
contributed a great deal toward the condition the victim is in. 
 
 All parties recognize that she does need continued – continued 
treatment.  Hopefully at some point in her life, she will be able to live a 
productive life but right now that is not the case.  The – so the impact on 
the victim is certainly a factor I am going to consider. 
 
(Sent. Hrg. Tr., p.24, Ls.14-25.) 
 The district court discussed the four goals of sentencing, including the protection 
of the public and society, and explained, “given the nature of the offense, that is a 
sentencing goal here.”  (Sent. Hrg. Tr., p.25, Ls.1-4.)  The court noted that, although 
rehabilitation is one of the goals, “so long as Mr. Taylor denies committing the crimes, 
[it] is probably not an important goal at this point.”  (Sent. Hrg. Tr., p.25, Ls.5-8.)  Lastly, 
the court responded to Taylor’s request that he be placed on probation, stating: 
I’m not going to do that.  It’s, first, the facts of the case do not support that.  
Also, I don’t believe he would be successful on probation because of the 
fact that he would be required to be treated as a sexual offender and so 
long as he denies that, the crime, that would be destine [sic] to fail, as 
would retaining jurisdiction.  The nature of the offense is one which 
requires a prison sentence. 
 
(Sent. Hrg. Tr., p.25, Ls.11-19.) 
 As correctly pointed out by Taylor on appeal, his LSI-R score indicates he is a 
low risk to reoffend, is well-educated, has had a teaching career, has the support of 
family and friends, and has no prior felony convictions.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.17-20.)  
As laudable and potentially beneficial as those factors are, they do not overcome the 
gravity of Taylor’s offense – digital and genital contact (and, as he confessed, slight 
vaginal penetration through both methods) with his five-year-old   
 Taylor has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that, under any 
reasonable view of the facts, his sentence of four years fixed followed by 11 years 
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indeterminate for lewd conduct is excessive.  This Court should affirm the district court’s 
sentence. 
 
CONCLUSION 
  
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Taylor’s conviction and 
sentence for lewd and lascivious conduct with a  under 16. 
 DATED this 12th day of July, 2017. 
 
       _/s/ John C. McKinney___________ 
 JOHN C. McKINNEY 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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